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Abstract
This paper revisits the classical question
of presupposition projection in a dynamic
approach to dialog using Hamblin’s
“commitment stores” (Hamblin, 1970). It
is based on a view of presuppositions as
selectionnal restrictions, conceived as
constraints on the definition domain of
functions. The specific update of com-
mitment stores achieved by the mere use
of lexical item having restricted definition
domains (presuppositions) is captured by
means of layered commitment stores dis-
tinguishing background commitments and
(classical) commitments arising from
what is said. The compatibility of this
dialogic approach with the dynamic theo-
ries of Heim (1983) and van der Sandt
(1992) is discussed in the course of the
paper.
1 Commitment stores
In Hamblin’s (1970) style, a dialog updates the
commitment stores (CS) of the speaker and
hearer, which means that linguistic expressions
should be defined in terms of instructions for up-
dating current commitment stores. CS are repre-
sented by Hamblin as lists of propositions,
keeping track of what the speaker and hearer got
committed to in virtue of what they have said
(and in virtue of what they have not raised objec-
tions against) in the current dialog.
CS should be distinguished clearly from what
will be called here the knowledge-base  (KB) of
each agent involved in the dialog. This data-base
is the whole set of propositions that the agent
takes for granted. Of course, there is a link be-
tween KB and CS, but this relation is not simple
and we do not want to take an a priori position
on this link. For instance, to end a dialog with p
in one CS does not imply that the agent belief is
that p is true, and even taking the initiative to
update one’s own CS with p does not imply that
the agent belief is that p is true. Moreover, as
Hamblin (1970) himself puts it, assuming that a
KB does not contain p and ¬p  is a standard as-
sumption, but to assume that a commitment store
never contains both would be probably too
strong. 1
CS has the general structure of a blackboard.
Both participants can “see” what both CSs show
at any time; only one participant's CS at once can
be updated; speech acts and linguistic expres-
sions are defined as rules for updating CS (add-
ing/retracting commitments).
The project is to use DRT as the language for
representing CS, which means providing a first-
order representation of the propositional content
enriched with dynamic information about context
change potential.2
Moreover, the DRS material will be split in two
parts: the foreground part and the background
part. This difference, which can be intuitively
seen as the use of two different colors, for writing
the conditions of a DRS, does not trigger any
change in the classical mechanism which com-
putes the binding relations and the truthful
embeddings of CSs in a Model : all DRS condi-
tions are just DRS conditions and only DRS con-
ditions. The difference between foreground/
background will only play a role in the rules for
updating CS. This kind of strategy contrasting
                                                            
1
 An important point, not considered in this paper, is related to the effects of
when it's said (Hamblin, 1970 b) : a CS is a list, hence the order in which
propositions are entered in a CS is relevant. A given CS can contain, for
instance  p,  and then ¬p. A real discussion of such cases being far beyond the
scope of this paper; let us just consider that in such cases , if a commitment
contradicts a previous one, the previous one is just retracted.
2
 The view that DRS should be conceived as CS is explicitly introduced by
Geurts (1995 : 29) : "I assume, therefore, that a DRS is is a partial picture of a
commitment slate".
different kinds of semantic information of the
same type has been adopted many times in the
literature and it seems to me that layered DRT
developed in Nijmegen by R. van der Sandt and
his colleagues is based on the same idea.3
The conception of CS used in this paper will be
kept as simple as possible by means of some ide-
alizations. We consider only light side commit-
ments, in the terminology of Walton & Krabbe,
(1995, pp. 134), which means that we stick to
Hamblin idea that commitments are public. We
do not consider either the difference between as-
sertion (an explicit claim of A), and concession
(what B claims without receiving any objection
from A). As in Hamblin's original examples, we
assume that what B claims without receiving any
objection from A becomes part of A's CS. This
latter simplification will allow us, to use in most
cases identical CS for A and B. Some very sche-
matic working rules can be used for the sake of
illustration.
If A uses a declarative sentence p, p’, the repre-
sentation of this sentence is entered in A’s CS.
If B does not object, p’ becomes a part of B’s CS.
I will not consider in the paper any “syntactic
rule” on dialog moves, i.e. rules which try to pre-
dict what a given expression, or a given CS con-
figuration, prohibits or imposes for the next
moves. I will only consider “semantic rules” i.e.
rules defining what a given expression triggers in
terms of CS  updates for the user of this expres-
sion, and I will consider only declarative sen-
tences (for the interpretation of questions in
dialog, see Ginzburg (1995).
2 Presuppositions as commitments
Although there are many debates about the nature
and behavior of presuppositions, most theories
would accept at least the following claims:
1– presuppositions are propositions; 2– they are
lexically triggered.
From this, we infer that presuppositions should
be entered in CS. The interpretation of 2 is not
straightforward. Let us assume that a presupposi-
tion of a lexical item I is triggered by the use of I.
This means that any use of I, in any logical con-
text (negation, modality, etc.), and for any illo-
cutionary force (assertion, question, etc.) triggers
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 Corblin (1991) argues that presuppositions should be treated as distin-
guished conditions of DRSs, which seems to be the same idea.
the ascription of I's presupposition to the CS of
the user of I. Although this view is by no means
original it faces two problems:
1. It is too strong: in some contexts, I is used, but
its potential presuppositions are not projected.
Some theories see these cases as "cancellation"
cases.
2. It is unmotivated: why should the mere use of
a lexical item, irrespective of the logical (e.g.
negation, conditional, etc.) context in which it is
embedded, commit its user to any propositional
content?
I will first try to provide an answer to question
(2). The general idea is to consider presupposi-
tions as selectional restrictions, a linguistic phe-
nomenon conceived as analogous to domain
restrictions on functions.
2.1 Selectional restrictions
Selectional restriction is a notion introduced by
Chomsky (1965), and  exemplified by (1) :
(1) I drink something.
It can be described, tentatively, as follows : the
lexical expression drink x  cannot be used for up-
dating any CS, unless the variable x is restricted
to a domain of individuals such that they satisfy
the condition liquid (x).Anyone trying to bypass
this rule would not be using the language prop-
erly. Consider for instance the potential utterance
(2) :
(2) Were you drinking an ap-
ple?
It seems to me that the most widespread judg-
ment on (2) is that it violates the rules of English.
If someone tries nevertheless, no update stem-
ming from the sentence itself is performed, but
the next moves in dialog will try to elucidate this
problem about the language supposed to be the
common language of the dialog.
Note that the condition liquid (x) has any proper-
ties of what is called a presupposition : it is pro-
positional, lexically triggered, and stemming
from the mere use of the verb drink whatever its
logical environment is. It gives rise to the same
phenomena, and can be captured by the same test
than classical examples of presuppositions. (3)
will quickly illustrate this:
 (3) A : I was not drinking
my X.
After (3), liquid (X) becomes a part of A's CS.
The hearer B can test this commitment against
her KB and can find three things in it : 1. liquid
(X); 2. ¬ liquid (X); 3. no information about liq-
uid (X).
Case 1 is the unmarked case: X is the known
common noun or a known trademark for a liquid.
Case 2 is a case where B must ask clarification
about the language used by A : either drink  or X
is used by A in a non-standard way. It can trigger
for instance moves like (4) which are typical of
reactions to presupposition failure:
(4) B : But one cannot DRINK
an X, X is not a liquid
Case 3 can be a case where B will learn that X is
a liquid; at least, she will learn that A uses it as
something that A takes for being in A and B's
KB.
There is a correspondence between these three
cases and the concepts found in the literature
which must be clarified. Case 1 reminds van der
Sandt (1992) notion of binding: the content liquid
(X) is found in some representation of the con-
text. Similarly it is close to the notion of satis-
faction used in satisfaction theories. Case 2
corresponds to what is called presupposition fail-
ure in most theories. Case 3 evokes strongly what
is called accommodation, in most theories using
the concept.
2.2 Presuppositions
Having argued that this typical example of selec-
tional restriction can be described in the same
terms than presuppositions, we are lead to con-
clude that presupposition might be nothing else
than selection. Selection itself is conceived on the
model of domain restrictions on the definition of
functions. It is based on the fact that some lexical
items contain constraints on their definition do-
main: the function associated to drink (x), is de-
fined for any x satisfying the function liquid(x),
and undefined otherwise. Using lexical items
with no consideration of their definition domain
is just not speaking the language. Conversely,
using a lexical item commits to the satisfaction of
its domain restrictions.
I will illustrate on some classical examples this
view of presupposition as selection:
A. Factive verbs.
(5) I regret that P.
Factive verbs presuppose the truth of their com-
plement p. What we said before is that drink (x)
is defined if liquid (x) is true, and undefined oth-
erwise. Similarly regret (p) is defined is p is true,
and undefined otherwise. We will thus analyze
regret (p) as triggering the background commit-
ment (BC) p. One can note that the form of the
presupposition is slightly different. For drink the
BC is a condition on the individual members of
the domain (liquid); for regret it is just the truth
of the propositional argument which is presup-
posed. This difference might be relevant for de-
limitating sub-classes, but the similarity is
important enough for claiming that we have ex-
amples of the same phenomenon.
2. Manage to.
(6) John managed to P.
In this case, p is not presupposed, but a condition
equivalent to: doing p was difficult for John is
associated to manage. The situation is very close
to the case of drink.
3. Definite descriptions.
(7) The king of France is
bald.
It is easy to see the, in the X as imposing the BC
that there is one and only one X.
2.3 Background commitments
We use for the representation of dialog CS de-
signed as classical DRSs distinguishing explicitly
BC from the other conditions. We will use in this
paper italics for BC.
A simplified CS for (7) is (8) :
(8)[x [king- of France (x),
bald (x)]]
Although binding is allowed between all com-
mitments, BC are distinguished from foreground
commitments by a set of properties which sup-
ports the decision to set them apart. In a sense,
BC are just the price one has to pay for using
lexical items, whatever one wants to convey
about a model by using these items. A dialog,
thus, is not designed for making public the BC of
the lexical items she uses, although just by using
such items the speaker is committed to them. BC
are made public, although the dialog is not set up
for making them public.
The most salient property associated to this
background status is that if p is introduced as a
BC, the probability to isolate p as an antecedent
for a propositional anaphor is very low. Depend-
ing on one's own theory of propositional anaph-
ora, one might suggest different reasons for this.
It can be seen as a mechanical consequence of
the fact that BC are propositions which are most
often not encoded under the linguistic form of a
clause. If your theory requires that the antecedent
of propositional anaphors be clauses, you explain
that presuppositions are not accessible to them. If
you do not make this assumption and let ana-
phors work on the semantic representation of the
discourse or dialog, you will have to block by an
additional stipulation the accessibility of BC.
Some examples will illustrate the difficulty to
isolate a BC as the antecedent of a propositonal
anaphor. In (9), although the sentence is repre-
sented as a conjunction (It was difficult for John
to fail & John failed), it is impossible to interpret
a propositional anaphor as taking the sole pre-
supposition as its antecedent :
(9) A: X managed to fail.
B: I cannot believe it.
Most speakers interpret B's sentence as : I cannot
believe X failed. 4 This is a case in which the pre-
supposition does not show up in the sentence as a
clause. The same is true for The King of France
case, and the presupposition is not accessible.
The most interesting cases for the discussion are
factive verbs, since they exhibit the presupposi-
tion under the form of a subordinate clause. Con-
sider the contrast (10)/(11) :
 (10) X regrets that Y left.
 (11) X says that Y left.
If it can be shown that the accessibility of the
subordinate clause is significantly lower in (10)
than in (11), it would be an argument showing
that as such, the BC status of an overtly ex-
pressed clause reduces its anaphoric accessibility.
I will not pursue the discussion on this for space
consideration.
A consequence is that a BC is introduced without
being isolated as an accessible topic for the on-
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  Note that the reading I cannot believe that it was difficult for him and that
he failed is not accessible either. If it were, one could argue that what happens
for the succession accommodated presupposition/assertion is not that different
from what happens for two conjoined assertions:
A. It was difficult for him to fail and he failed.
B. I cannot believe it.
Most speakers can interpret B's assertion as : I cannot believe that it was
difficult and that he failed, even if they express a preference for taking as
antecedent the last expressed proposition.
This shows that bakground commitments cannot be treated as would be a
previous assertion.
going dialog. A BC, thus, cannot be a QUD
(questions under discussion), see Ginzburg
(1995). In other words, encoding as a BC a given
information gives no chance to know more about
it in the dialog because it is not an accessible
topic. The other side of the coin is that BC en-
codes normally shared information, that is to say
information that the dialog is not designed to ma-
nipulate.
Some other distinctive properties can be associ-
ated to BC.
- BC must be contested immediately. Beaver
(2001) insists on this distinctive property of pre-
suppositions, and the present proposal provides a
nice context for discussing this point. In dialog,
the participants can hold contradictory theses,
and a single participant can change her mind in
the course of the discussion. If I do not object
immediately to your assertion p, which becomes
part of my commitment, p is by no means pro-
tected from latter attacks. But it is a common ob-
servation that to come back after a while on a BC
p for adopting explicitly a commitment ¬p, is
judged unfair if the initiative is taken by the op-
ponent; if taken by the proponent of the BC, it is
even worse. I will try to suggest some justifica-
tion of this based on the very notion of BC.
– the rejection of a BC by the opponent comes
with the cancellation of the utterance containing
its trigger. "Cancellation" means that any effect
on the opponent CS update is cancelled. Many
BC being existence commitments one might
think that this is not a property of BC, but a prop-
erty of existence commitments. But in the case of
selectional restrictions (see the case of drink), the
BC is not a BC of existence, and this is also true
for some classical examples of presuppositions
(e.g. manage). In those cases, my intuition is that,
if one rejects the BC, one suspends any update,
and waits (or asks) for an elucidation. Suppose
for example someone says to you that John man-
aged to pass the exam, and that for you, John is
the best student of the class. Would you just re-
ject explicitly the BC, keeping the information
that John passed; or would you suspend any up-
date, thinking for instance that the proponent may
be actually speaking of someone else that John
(satisfying the BC) and convey no information
about John? My impression is that when one is in
doubt about the capacity of the proponent to
choose the right word for speaking of a Model,
this doubt extends to any part of the utterance.
- for rejecting a BC there are specific linguistic
devices which are also used for language mis-
takes: metalinguistic negation and stress on the
"wrong" word. Typical cases are illustrated in the
following examples :
(12)But one cannot DRINK an
X, one can only EAT an X.
(13)John did not MANAGE to
succeed; he succeeded be-
cause the exam was very easy
for him.
All these properties are coherent with the view of
BC advocated in this paper. The rejection of BC,
if any, must be immediate because it is unex-
pected, it would cancel the whole utterance, and
it would cast doubts about the language used in
the current dialog.
3 The projection problem
The general idea is that any user of a lexical BC
trigger is committed to its BC. We expect, then,
in general, the BC of a complex sentence to be
the conjunctions of its BC. The only resources
we have for deriving the so-called "cancellation"
cases, are linked to the notion of "user of a lexi-
cal item", and to the notion of context of satis-
faction of a BC.
3.1 Plugs
The classical theory of presupposition projection
set up by Karttunen (1973, p. 178) distinguishes
three kinds of contexts: plugs, holes, and filters.
Dynamic theories of presupposition projection
(the satisfaction theory and the binding-
accommodation, see Geurts 1995)) are mainly
concerned with filters, and what they have to say
about plugs and holes is not very clear. The pre-
sent proposal, in contrast, provides a straightfor-
ward explanation for the existence of plugs.
Plugs are defined by Karttunen as contexts which
blocks all the presuppositions of the complement
sentence. Typical examples are : say, mention,
tell, ask.5 They are precisely contexts that allow
taking their lexical trigger as used by another
agent (reported speech), not by the speaker. In
other words, in the context of these verbs, the
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 I follow here the presentation of Beaver (2001, p. 54).
speaker does not necessarily take herself the re-
sponsibility of using these lexical items, but
might only be reporting the words another
speaker used (John says that the king of France
is bald). Our explanation is straightforward: who
uses a lexical item is committed to its BC, and
not who reports the use of a lexical item by
someone else, provided that she makes explicit
that she would not use herself this word. The
later condition is crucial although we will not go
into details here. The fact that this condition is
very difficult to satisfy (because after all, a
speaker makes use of any lexical item she utters
(except in direct reported speech) explains that
plugs are not strict barriers against projection of
the BC in the speaker CS.
The prediction of the theory is that any other
context should be a Karttunen's hole i.e. a context
in which any BC is made part of the speaker's
CS. 6
3.2 Filters
Filters have the following relevant features: in
some constructions (e.g. the antecedent of a con-
ditional), the presence of an expression entailing
a presupposition of the consequent, prevents the
presupposition to be ascribed to the CS of the
speaker. A typical case is (14) :
(14) If France is a monar-
chy, the king of France is
bald.
Gazdar (1979), Heim (1983) and van der Sandt
(1992) are well known proposals devoted to ex-
plain the existence of filters (see Beaver 2001).
Most properties of context change potential ap-
proaches (Heim 1983) transpose nicely in our
framework without any ad hoc stipulation: if a
trigger is used in the consequent of a conditional,
the user is committed to the presupposition in her
top-level CS updated by the antecedent. This is a
direct consequence of what is a BC : to use a
trigger in the consequent means that your top-
level CS updated by the antecedent is a context in
which the trigger is licensed. If the antecedent
update entails the BC, as in (14) this requirement
is satisfied and no update is necessary. If not, the
speaker is committed to the presupposition satis-
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 We have not enough space here for discussing attitudes verbs (Heim 1992,
Geurts 1995). What have been said about verbs reporting speech acts would
be a worth trying starting point.
faction in her (toplevel) CS. A comparison to
Gazdar (1979) proposal will lead to make this
formulation more precise.
Gazdar’s treatment of cases like (14) relies cru-
cially on Hintikka’s logic of belief, and on the
notion of clausal implicature:
(15) Clausal implicature of
P→ Q :¬K(P),¬K(¬P),¬K(Q),¬K(
¬Q). (the speaker has no be-
lief about P)
Gazdar predicts that the presupposition p of the
consequent is cancelled because if projected, it
would contradict the clausal implicature triggered
by the use of if P (if P entails p).
But examples like (16) show that this cannot be
the right explanation :
(16) Mary is sleeping. If
Mary is sleeping, John knows
that she is sleeping. Thus
John knows that she is
sleeping.
The speaker is committed to P by the first sen-
tence, but if P… is used then, which shows that
the use of if P is compatible with the commit-
ment to P. The key part of Gazdar explanation
(i.e. the clausal implicature) seems, in other
words, to meet empirical objections.
But such cases force us to strengthen our own
proposal. Once admitted that P and if P are com-
patible in a CS, we need an additional principle
for ensuring that the presupposition of the conse-
quent is not projected at the top-level. I propose
that the relevant principle is the Minimal Com-
mitment Principle (MCP) :
(17) MCP : The update of CS
by BC is minimal. A poten-
tial BC P ends up as a BC
iff the use of its trigger
is not licensed otherwise.
MCP ensures that in (14), since the antecedent of
the conditional entails a BC of the consequent, no
update of the CS is done.
Van der Sandt's anaphoric treatment of presuppo-
sitions would consider (14) as a case in which the
presupposition tries to find its antecedent in the if
clause. In (14) anaphora to the if clause fails, and
looks for an antecedent at the top-level of the
DRS. If (14) is the first sentence of a discourse,
no antecedent can be found. Accommodation is
then tried at this level. Accommodation is con-
strained by contextual acceptability. I will dis-
cuss briefly van der Sandt constraints7, while
running through the example, trying to establish
whether they are compatible with the present ap-
proach:
(i) informativeness: prevents to accommodate a
presupposition which is entailed by the DRS.
MCP seems to have roughly the same effect: if
you are already committed to P, any BC entailed
by P will trigger no update. Note that in the CS
approach, this is a constraint on BC, not on
commitments. Nothing prevents the reiteration of
an assertion in a dialog, as everyday life shows.
(ii) consistency:  prevents to accommodate ¬P if
the DRS entails P. Although the CS framework
allows explicit contradiction in a dialog, the very
notion of BC suggests that the retraction of a
previous commitment by means of a BC is not a
standard strategy.
 (iii) no accommodation can be such that some
subordinate DRS is either entailed or contra-
dicted by a superordinate DRS.
This constraint seems to be based on the same
intuition than Gazdar's clausal implicature (see
above). Although van der Sandt gives it explicitly
as a constraint on accommodation, he overtly
makes it an application of a general principle on
discourse coherence which would exclude cases
like (16).8 The MCP, in contrast, will derive (14)
without predicting anything about (16).
Let us now consider the treatment of (14) by (i)-
(iii). Top-level accommodation is blocked by
(iii): one cannot accommodate something that
entails a subordinate DRS. There is a king of
France entails France is a monarchy. We try
then to accommodate in the antecedent, and this
is allowed if France is a Monarchy does not en-
tail that there is a king of France. It the entail-
ment holds, the informativeness principle (i) is
violated.
At first glance, van der Sandt's system makes the
same empirical prediction that the MCP for (14),
but I see at least one potential problem with this
strategy. As I understand the way of treating (14)
with (i)-(iii), the theory assumes a strong logical
difference between the two propositions. In (14)
we need to accept:
There is a king of F.  |= F. is a monarchy
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  Van der Sandt (1992, p. 367).
8
 There is no doubt that this is van der Sandt's interpretation of the constraint
as shows his illustrative example (63a):John has a dog. If he has a dog, he
has a cat.
He gives this piece of discourse as unacceptable, although it is for me correct.
If not, accommodation on top-level is allowed.
But we need to accept as well:
F is a monarchy  |≠ There is a king of F.
If we do not, accommodation in the antecedent is
not informative.
But this distinction is not plausible if one consid-
ers the following couple of examples:
(18) If John has a wife, his
marriage is very recent.
(19)If John is married, his
wife is French.
The theory, as I understand it, would have to as-
sume that in (18): to be married |= having a wife,
and to have a wife |≠ to be married. But in (19),
the theory would have to assume that to have a
wife |= to be married, and to be married  |≠ to
have a wife. It is hard to believe that the proc-
essing of these two sentences might be grounded
on so strict, subtle and incompatible logical rela-
tions between the predicates to be married and to
have a wife.
Our proposal escapes this problem because we do
not manipulate logical relations between propo-
sitions but constraints on definition domains for
the use of lexical items. "To be licensed", in the
MCP (17) means than if a proposition is true, it is
legitimate to make use of a given lexical item for
it. But to the truth of the proposition, we do not
associate strict logical inferences involving the
lexical item. It is be more in the spirit of our view
to see licensing as based on default generic im-
plications like: if X is a monarchy, normally,
there is a King(Queen) of X; if X is the King of
X, normally, X is a monarchy. We all know real
cases in which there are monarchies without sov-
ereign and sovereigns without monarchies.
What we conclude from this discussion is that
the MCP derives correctly the "filtering effect" of
quantified structures without assuming the "con-
textual acceptability" constraints needed in van
der Sandt's approach, which are not without
problems.
3.3 Commitments and Knowledge-Bases
(20) exemplifies a classical problem for presup-
position projection theories:
(20) Any woman cherishes her
child.
The problem is that this sentence is admissible in
a dialog, although none of its users would accept
to be committed to Any woman has a child. A
solution is to let such sentences be interpreted as:
(21) Any woman (having a
child) cherishes her child.
But this solution is too strong because it would
legitimate, contrary to facts, any "intermediate
accommodation" like in (22):
(22) Any woman likes her
Ferrari.
In the present framework, like in Heim (1983), it
is predicted that (20) triggers the BC that any
woman has a child. Van der Sandt (1992, p.364)
predicts for (20) the interpretation (21) on the
basis of a structural constraint on bind-
ing/accommodation. The pronoun her must be
bound by its antecedent any woman, and conse-
quently, the accommodation of an antecedent for
the child of x can only be done in the scope of
any woman. But the contextual acceptability con-
straints (i)-(iii), see §3.2, cannot rule out (22).
In a nutshell, although a strictly universal com-
mitment is not projected, a purely accidental and
unexpected property like in (22) makes the sen-
tence odd. 9
We need, it seems, a treatment which commits
the user of (20) at least to the BC that "stereo-
typical women have a child". This would derive
the acceptability contrast (20)/(22). Let us stick
to the prediction that the basic interpretation of
such structures projects a universal BC. This is
what happens if the discourse is not generic, and
is about a restricted set of individuals.10
(23) Every boy took his Fer-
rari (bike)and left.
(23) commits to the BC that every boy (within a
particular context-set) had a Ferrari (bike).11
Now if the sentence is generic, the KB of the
participants knows whether this universal BC is
true or not: in the sentence (22), we now that it is
not. Let us take this contradiction between the
universal commitment mechanically projected by
the structure and a proposition of the (shared)
KB, a necessary condition for triggering the sus-
pension of the universal BC projection. The suffi-
cient condition is that the correspondent
stereotypical BC be the case, which is true for
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  See Beaver (2001, §5.6) for a discussion pointing to the relevance of
genericity in such examples.
10
  See Beaver (2001).
11
 I am not sure how van der Sandt's approach would accommodate this
generic/specific contrast.
bike (in some societies), not for Ferrari. The
relevant configuration for (20) is thus:
(24) CS potential update: 
any W has a C
KB:
¬ (any W has a C)
GEN (W have C)
For (22), although the necessary condition is sat-
isfied, the sufficient condition is not, and the
sentence is odd. If both conditions are satisfied,
the sentence is interpreted as projecting a weaker
BC (stereotypical, not universal). We can explain
in this approach why sentences like (20) give the
impression that the proponent speaks as if the
property were universal (this is the basic inter-
pretation) and why it commits to stereotypes (a
typical woman has a child). Moreover we can
understand why such sentences are perceived as
shortcuts and why these shortcuts although they
commit to BC stereotypes are nevertheless so
often used. For this, let us compare (20) to the
fully explicit (BC-less) version (25):
(25) Every woman having a
child cherishes her child.
This sentence is perfectly acceptable and "clean"
(deprived of any BC about women and child). It
has nevertheless some features which might lead
speakers to prefer the "shortened" version. For
most speakers the sentence has a redundancy fla-
vor, and the more the property is stereotypical,
the more it is perceptible. The reason might be
that to restrict X with a stereotypical property of
X creates for ordinary discourse the same kind of
redundancy than to restrict X with a property
strictly entailed by X. The underlying principle
might be that by default, one always speaks of
stereotypical cases. Compare: any triangle hav-
ing three angles, any man having two hands, any
French man having a car,…. By choosing this
explicit option, then, the speaker treats stereo-
types exactly as any property and does not make
use of the shared knowledge of the evoked
stereotype.
The commitment framework suggests thus to see
the so called "intermediate accom-modation" as a
pragmatic weakening of the semantic universal
BC, relying heavily on KB and stereotypes.
4 Conclusion
The general idea of this paper is that presupposi-
tions are background commitments arising from
the use of lexical items involving restrictions on
their definition domain. We have tried to give
some arguments showing that this idea is worth
trying, an the paper has been devoted mainly to
illustrate the basic intuitions of this dialogic ap-
proach and to point to some issues on which it
seems to do better than current dynamic ap-
proaches. The next step will be to test this view
of presuppositions in a formalized version of the
CS framework in order to develop a more sys-
tematic comparison with the predictions of these
theories.
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